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 Since the industrial revolution, advances in science and 
technology have continuously accounted for most of the 
growth and wealth accumulation in leading industrialized 
economies. In recent years, the contribution of 
technological progress to growth and welfare 
improvement has increased even further, especially with 
the globalization process which has been characterized by 
exponential growth in exports of manufactured goods. 
This paper establishes the existence of a technology trap 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. It shows that the widening income 
and welfare gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest 
of world is largely accounted for by the technology trap 
responsible for the poverty trap. This result is supported 
by empirical evidence which suggests that if countries 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, World Bank Institute—is part of 
a larger effort in the department to understand the determinants of growth and economic development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the knowledge economy era. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at hfofack@worldbank.org.  
in Sub-Saharan Africa were using the same level of 
technology enjoyed by industrialized countries income 
levels in Sub-Saharan Africa would be significantly 
higher. The result is robust, even after controlling for 
institutional, macroeconomic instability and volatility 
factors. Consistent with standard one-sector neoclassical 
growth models, this suggests that uniform convergence 
to a worldwide technology frontier may lead to income 
convergence in the spherical space. Overcoming the 
technology trap in Sub-Saharan Africa may therefore 
be essential to achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals and evolving toward global convergence in the 
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Over the past few decades, development economists and growth theorists have assigned increasingly 
larger weights to technological progress and research and development in growth models [Romer 
(1986), Lucas (1988)].2 Presumably this calibration has been done to better estimate aggregate 
outputs, but also to better understand the process of wealth creation and accumulation. This 
emphasis on technology and human capital accumulation in the new growth theory reflects the 
significance of efficiency and productivity gains achieved under the impulse of technological 
progress, knowledge and skills acquisition [Mansfield (1972), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996)]. It is also 
the result of persistent income gap across countries and resilience of structural differences in the 
process of growth and wealth creation, not always accounted for by traditional neoclassical growth 
models.  
 
The first generation of these neoclassical growth models put emphasis on capital and labor in the 
specification of production functions and estimation of aggregate output [King and Rebelo (1993)]. 
The basic assumption underpinning these models is that growth is exclusively driven by two primary 
factors: capital accumulation and labor increases. However, departing from this dual input 
assumption, Solow’s seminal research on productivity showed that much of economic growth cannot 
be attributed to increases in capital and labor alone [Solow (1956, 1957)]. The adjustment to these 
models to account for technological progress and innovations, for education and skills building and 
use of technology reflects the importance of these factors for productivity growth and output 
expansion. Analytically, these adjustments are captured by the growing importance of the Solow’s 
residual— the contribution of total factor productivity to growth.  
 
Additionally, these adjustments are the result of a counterintuitive slow convergence of income and 
asymptotic rates of growth between industrial and developing countries [Lucas (1988), Rebelo 
(1998)]. The convergence hypothesis is underlined by the diminishing returns to capital assumption, 
whereby real interest rates should be proportionally low in countries with low capital stocks and thus, 
enhance investment growth and catching-up in the process of capital accumulation.3 Contrary to this 
hypothesis most countries in the developing world, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, did 
not systematically record growth rates that were substantially higher than the ones observed in the 
more advanced economies to gradually narrow their income gap, however. In fact investment and 
capital accumulation rates were markedly lower and growth volatility was more pronounced resulting 
in negative long-run average economic growth rates across the region [Easterly and Levine (1997), 
Fofack (2007)].  
 
In contrast, the sustained economic and per capita income growth achieved in the more advanced 
economies further widened the already large welfare gaps between the rest of the world and Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) [Azariadis and Stachurski (2004)].4 In addition, cross-country variations in long-
                                                 
2 Indeed, according to a recent study published by the US Department of Commerce, knowledge is explaining 
an increasingly large part of the US multifactor productivity, which grew to about 33 percent between 1995 and 
2002, from approximately 20 percent.   
3 Contrary to the underlined hypothesis, interest rates have been structurally high in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
are largely responsible for the domestic credit crunch, which has undermined investment and growth prospects 
and led to the development of parallel informal financial institutions. 
4 For instance, between 1960 and 2000 PPP- adjusted average income per capita rose from US$10,594 to 
US$25,641 in Australia. Similar growth rates were recorded in other OCED countries. 
  2run growth and the process of wealth creation remain important in the developing world. Despite the 
similarities of initial conditions, emerging market economies, which opted for development models 
that emphasize human capital development and technological progress achieved sustained and higher 
economic growth rates and a rapid increase in per capita income [Amsden (1991), Nelson and Pack 
(1999), Yusuf and Nabeshima (2007)]. The narrowing scientific and technological gap between these 
emerging market economies and the leading industrialized countries resulted in a significant 
reduction of income and welfare gap between these two groups of countries over the last few 
decades [Mathews and Hu (2007), Lucas (2007)].5  
 
Unlike emerging markets economies, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa did not operate similar 
adjustments to foster technological progress and innovations in models underlying their growth and 
development processes, however. Worse, they witnessed a significant deterioration of their research 
and scientific infrastructures, partly as a result of a dramatic decline of public spending allocated to 
academic and research institutions in the face of rising fiscal deficits during the adjustment era 
[Teferra and Altbach (2003), UNESCO (2005)]. Over time, the deterioration of scientific 
infrastructure and widening education and skills gap with the rest of the world emerged as major 
constraints to research and development and to the adoption and use of new technologies in support 
of growth and economic development in the region. As a result of these constraints, most African 
countries have consistently operated in the lowest technology ladder, far off the global technology 
frontier, a contrast that we characterize as technology trap in this paper. 
 
The persistency under this technology trap has come with tremendous costs in terms of economic 
growth and welfare to the region [Bloom et al. (2005), Fofack (2005), Hassan (2007)].6 On average 
the region overwhelmingly faced lower productivity, excess and higher growth volatility and lower 
investment and growth rates over the globalization era characterized by exceptional long-run growth 
and booms in global trade and manufactured exports [World Bank (2002), Artadi and Sala-i-Martin 
(2003)]. The costs of technology deficit also include delayed economic diversification at the structural 
levels. The growing size of informal sector production and high unemployment rates, direct 
consequences of delayed economic diversification and changes in the structural patterns of growth, 
are other inherent costs.  
 
These additional costs have tremendous welfare and fiscal implications at the policy level. While 
poverty rates are projected to fall in most other regions of the developing world, a rising trend is 
predicted in Sub-Saharan Africa where unemployment rates have continued to soar in the face of a 
structurally lower productivity and in the absence of sustained investment rates and industrial output 
expansion [Chen and Ravallion (2004), Berg and Qureshi (2005)]. However, as a growing number of 
countries projected to meet the Millennium Development Goals in the rest of the developing world 
do so, addressing the technology trap may become even more critical to exiting the poverty trap— 
vicious circle of persistently high incidence of poverty and low savings and investment 
opportunities— in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
The object of this paper is to assess the implications of poor research and technological 
infrastructure for growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. It establishes the existence of a technology trap in 
                                                 
5 For instance, with technologically-induced economic development, average growth rate of GDP increased in 
excess of 6.0 percent between 1970 and 2000 in Korea, leading to over fivefold increase in per capita income, 
which reached US$20,000 in 2005, from a little over US$1900 in 1970. For discussion on the effects of 
technological adoption on East Asia development, see Amsden (1991), Baark (1991) and Yusuf (2003).  
6 Professor Mohamed Hassan, the President of the African Academy of Sciences, stressed that progress on the 
development ladder would only be achieved if there is commitment to promote homegrown sciences during 
the African Union meeting of Head of State in June 2007. In this regard, he said “Every African nation must 
educate and support a new generation of problem-solving scientists.” 
  3the region and investigates its implications for welfare. It estimates the potential gains in terms of 
income growth and poverty reduction, inherent to hypothetical advances in technology from pseudo-
panel models. A control experiment allows a simulation of the potential growth effects of improved 
scientific infrastructures and models the hypothetical losses illustrated by lower GDP growth rates. 
Under this experiment and assuming all other things equal, empirical results reveal significantly high 
costs of technology trap for growth and welfare in the region. In particular, it is shown that if African 
countries were operating on the global technology frontier enjoyed by OECD countries, their income 
level would be significantly higher, over four times the current estimates ceteris paribus.7  
 
These results are robust, even after controlling for institutional and macroeconomic instability. They 
corroborate the positive science-development link, and are consistent with findings from principal 
component analysis. In addition, the model is calibrated to estimate the long-term effects of 
sustained technologically-driven growth on poverty in Ethiopia. The results highlight a uniform 
decline of poverty rates under an hypothetical increased applications and use of technology. In 
particular, sustained increase in research and development results in a significant reduction of the 
headcount index.   
 
The next section provides an historical overview of technology and development link and establishes 
the existence of a technology trap in SSA. Section III discusses low-technology-based poverty trap 
models and empirically tests the existence of a technology trap in the region using the principal 
components analysis. Section IV proposes a model for estimating the welfare effects of advances in 
science and technology. Section V discusses the empirical results and the last section concludes.   
 
 
II.  Global technology-led growth and Africa’s low-technology trap 
 
The implications of technological progress and scientific innovations for welfare go back as far as the 
pre-industrialization era when scientific inventions and tool-making technologies were used in the 
field of medicine, agriculture and metallurgy within a very constricted organizational framework. 
Initially, the link between technology and human development is primarily motivated by short-term 
benefits and particularly population well-being. Efficiency gains and considerations and direct impact 
on income growth and wealth accumulation, possibly emanating from economies of scale and 
productivity growth, is relatively limited, owing largely to the preeminence of subsistence economies 
characterized by low capital-labor ratio and missing or segmented markets [Maddison (1995)].  
 
However, with advances in science and technology and engineering applications, particularly 
following the industrial revolution, specialization and growing demands, the link between technology 
and economic development grew stronger. Over time, it became more evident through a self-
reinforcing process of knowledge accumulation in a virtuous circle of sustained growth fuelled by 
consumption booms. These advances were made possible by technological innovations and scientific 
prowess which contributed to the development of infrastructure, transportation, communication and 
manufacturing, all key for productivity growth and industrial output expansion [Smiles (1966), 
Mansfield (1980)].8  
 
                                                 
7 Though variable over time, the global technology frontier is space invariant as it obeys the principle of unicity; 
however, it is product-driven. For instance, Taiwan closed its gap with the world technology frontier in the 
manufacturing of semiconductors in the late 1990s [Mathews and Hu (2007)]. Evidently, there are certainly 
numerous areas of production where it is still operating inside the frontier, nonetheless.   
8 In a book published in 1888 and titled the live of engineers, Samuel Smile attributed the reduction of income and 
welfare gaps between Britain and its neighboring European rivals to the success of British engineers and 
scientists, who endowed Britain with the most modern infrastructures in Europe. 
  4In practice, research and development and sciences and technological applications were critical in the 
process of economic growth, diversification and changing structural patterns of growth [Solow 
(1957)]. In most countries benefiting from advances in technology, the increasing share of industrial 
output was gradually compensated by a steady decline of primary sectors’ contribution to aggregate 
GDP. In particular, agricultural employment, which then dominated primary sector production and 
employed the majority of active labor force, entered a long cycle of declining trend. This decline 
followed a tremendous surge in productivity as a result of mechanization and intensification of 
production processes. Sustained productivity growth in the agricultural sector allowed labor force 
shift towards industry to meet growing demands of manufactured goods in the post-industrial 
revolution era.  
 
In the United Kingdom, employment in agriculture fell consistently after the industrial revolution, 
from about 40 percent of active labor force in 1820 to approximately 12 percent in 1913 [Maddison 
(1995, 2001)]. Most recent estimates place it at 2.2 percent. Similarly, a steadily declining trend is 
observed in most other advanced economies across and outside Europe. According to latest 
estimates, the agricultural labor force would account for less than 3 percent of the active labor force 
in the United States and in other leading industrialized economies (see Panel A in Figure 1).  
 
Though the process of structural transformation and changing patterns of growth primarily started in 
the leading industrialized countries, a similar trend of declining agricultural labor force has also been 
observed in emerging market economies over the past decades. According to Nelson and Pack 
(1999), the assimilation of modern technology and the changes in the structural patterns of growth 
have been the critical component of the East Asian Miracle. In the Republic of Korea, the changing 
structure of the economy has notably been illustrated in the declining share of primary commodities 
production in aggregate output and evolving composition of the labor force [Lucas (2007)]. 
Agricultural employment, which accounted for over 49 percent of the total active labor force in 1970 
has been on a steady declining trend over the past decades and fell to 8 percent in 2003.   
 
In contrast to the global trend, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa remain largely confined to primary 
agricultural production. A disproportionately large segment of their active labor force continues to be 
employed in the agricultural sector. Except in a few cases, such as South Africa and Mauritius where 
the structural transformation of their economies has taken place, the share of agricultural labor force 
has remained extremely high for most other countries, largely in excess of 70 percent. The graph in 
the second panel of Figure 1 contrasts the near linear trend with slope converging to zero for the 
curve of agricultural labor force in the sub-sample of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with the rapidly 
declining trend in the more advanced and diversified economies in panel A.  
 
Paradoxically, despite the lion’s share of agricultural labor force, the region continues to rely heavily 
on imports of food grains to make up for the shortage of supply and mitigate the volatility of 
agricultural output in the face of continued exposure to exogenous shocks.9 The systematically larger 
share of agricultural labor force in Sub-Saharan Africa and low productivity of the sector are largely 
the consequences of delayed economic diversification and failures to adjust to the changing patterns 
of the global economy, increasingly relying on technology, research and development for sustained 
productivity growth and mitigation of negative shocks [Salam (1987), Mansfield (1995)].    
 
The technology trap in Sub-Saharan Africa is at odds with the going trend across the developing 
world, however. While advanced economies first benefited from the self-reinforcing process of 
knowledge and technological progress, enjoying rapid income growth especially in the post-industrial 
revolution era, other developing countries, particularly in Asia, later invested significantly to improve 
                                                 
9 The shortage of supply and volatility of agricultural production in Africa is often attributed to excess 
vulnerability to the environment in a region that has not yet achieved its green revolution.   
  5their research and scientific infrastructure in support of productivity growth and industrial output 
expansion [Nelson and Pack (1999)]. According to the latest statistics, Asia’s Global Expenditure on 
Research and Development (GERD) reached 32 percent of world total, exceeding the EU share (27 
percent). In contrast, the Sub-Saharan Africa’s share, already the lowest (0.6 percent), declined even 
further [Westholm et al. (2004), UNESCO (2005)].10 
 
Figure 1: Trend of agricultural labor force as a percentage of total labor force  
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10 The declining research and development funding has consequences and implications for the performance of 
higher learning institutions and their positioning at the global level. Over the past few years, not a single 
African institution has appeared in the global ranking of top 100 universities in the world.  
  6 
The returns of increased research expenditures and technological advances are felt at the output 
level—number of researchers and scientific output growth. Asian counties are training a large 
number of engineers and scientists every year. According to the latest statistics, that region is 
comfortably positioned on the skilled endowment ladder, with more than 780 engineers and 
scientists per million. The averages across Sub-Saharan Africa and industrial countries are 83 and 
about 1,100, respectively [Fofack (2005)].11 The returns have also been spectacular in terms of 
increased scientific output, economic growth and contribution to global trade, reflecting the 
convergence between emerging market economies and the traditionally industrialized economies on 
the scientific and technological ladder.  
 
In fact, most countries in Asia markedly increased their share of global trade, as reflected in their 
strong reserve position [Summers (2006)].12 Their growing reserve base has accelerated the changing 
landscape of the international financial architecture. Emerging market economies have become the 
major suppliers of global savings, a change from the immediate post-independence world dominated 
by the developed and developing countries dichotomy. In turn, a number of traditional industrialized 
economies are increasingly relying on savings accumulated by emerging market economies to finance 
their current account deficits. The combined current account surpluses of China and emerging 
market economies of Asia alone represents about 25 percent of US net international borrowings 
[Summers (2006)].  
 
The remarkable success in the catching-up process achieved by emerging markets economies is 
largely attributed to technological advances and innovations [Mansfield (1988), Amsden (1991), 
Nelson and Pack (1999)]. In fact according to these authors most emerging markets economies 
adopted deliberate policies of sustained investment in research and development and promotion of 
technology acquisition and innovations in support of growth and a structural transformation of their 
economies with a growing share of the modern sector. However, the process of technology 
acquisition varies across these countries. While some relied predominantly on technology transfers in 
the initial phase of their economic transformation, others took the path of building research and 
development (R&D) capabilities early on [Aw (2003)].13  
 
The contribution of technological progress to the catching-up on the development ladder is not new, 
however. Already in the 1970s, when the income gaps between the US (latecomer) and Europe was 
growing, the dominant discourse in the latter focused on the notion of ‘technology lag’, in particular 
because research and development and innovations were then already seen as critical sources of 
comparative advantage. Over the past few years, R&D has remained robust in explaining cross-
national differences in growth among developed countries, with its contribution to real growth of 
GDP growing unabated [Mansfield (1972), Gittleman and Wolff (1995)]. In particular, a recent study 
                                                 
11 Despite their impressive growth, the numbers of scientists and engineers trained in Asia are still rising. India 
is projected to produce over half a million engineers and scientists on an annual basis by 2009 [Mallaby (2006)]. 
12 In a recent classification of countries with large reserve position, emerging market economies from Asia 
dominated the list of countries with excess reserves above the Greenspan-Guidotti Rule. Six out of ten 
countries were Asian, and the first three countries with the largest reserve position include China, Taiwan and 
Korea in that order. Other emerging markets economies topping the list include India, Malaysia and Thailand; 
and the remaining four countries are predominantly oil exporters. For further details, see Summers (2006).  
13 However, the process of technology acquisition is non linear. In a number of cases, countries have relied on 
both technology transfers via the FDI inflows and on research and development. While in others, they have 
evolved from being users of technology to leading the process of knowledge and technology creation. 
Singapore and Korea will fit this dual model. For further details, see Wong (2003).   
  7showed that investments in R&D have played a significant role in US long-run growth over the past 
decades [Okubo et al. (2006)].14 
 
With the catching-up process resulting from the convergence between traditional industrialized 
countries— old industrialized economies— and emerging markets economies—newly industrialized 
economies— on the technological and scientific ladder, these two groups of countries now account 
for most of the global trade, over 90%, a natural trend in a world where exports of manufactured 
goods grew almost exponentially over the past decades to account for as much of global trade. This 
resulting outcome— a consequence of converging technological and scientific paths between 
traditional industrialized economies and emerging markets economies— is consistent with standard 
neoclassical growth models. These models predict that countries with the same preferences and 
technology will converge to identical levels of income and asymptotic growth rates.  
 
The process of convergence on the technology ladder is not uniform on the spherical space, 
however. The skewed distribution of technology diffusion has marginalized the Sub-Saharan African 
region, which is locked in a technology trap— whereby countries are overwhelmingly clustered 
around the lower scale on the technology ladder. With empirical evidence supporting the benefits of 
R&D for growth, the underlined Africa’s technology trap may be largely responsible for its poverty 
trap. In fact and to a large extent, the skewed distribution of growth at the global level is largely 
attributed to a limited geographical diffusion of technology [Easterlin (1981), Lucas (2007)]. The 
proposition below sums up the implications of a technology trap for stunted growth and skewed 
global distribution of income. 
 
Proposition 1: Let   and   represent the level of technology embodying state of 
knowledge and innovations which enable continued output expansion and growth even for 
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In other words, output growth in the country   that is enjoying rapid technological advances will 
always grow faster as a result of continued productivity growth. Over time, the output and income 
gaps with country
A
B , caught in a technology trap, will continue to grow. Even holding other key 
determinants of growth constant in the two countries, long-run persistency under a technology trap 
will result in widening income gap in the technology deficit country where the structural patterns of 
growth may remain unchanged and per capita income abysmally low. (See the Technical Annex for 
proof of Proposition 1.) 
                                                 
14 This study proposes a new methodology based on “Research and Development Satellite Account” to 
estimate the effect of investment in R&D on US economic growth. According to this study, if R&D spending 
were included in the GDP as investment instead of as an expense, investment would be 11 percent higher and 
national savings rate would be 16 percent instead of 14 percent. Similarly, decades earlier, Solow (1957) 
attributed over 87 per cent of sustained increases in US gross output to technical changes.  
  8 
Interestingly, the B-representation better captures stylized facts of most African economies. The 
implications of technology trap in Sub-Saharan Africa— whereby African countries are 
overwhelmingly clustered in the lower scale on the technology ladder, extend beyond their abysmally 
low contribution to global trade and uniform patterns of growth, however. The recurrence of balance 
of payments crises and macroeconomic imbalances following negative terms of trade shocks, which 
have partly fuelled the cycle of external indebtedness, are other inherent consequences. The long-
term costs may also include the structurally low level of productivity, a constraint to FDI inflows 
[Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Pattillo et al. (2006)]. 
 
 
III.  Testing for a low-technology-based poverty trap 
 
With a persistency of poverty across Sub-Saharan Africa, a growing strand of the economic literature 
is focusing on empirically testing the plausibility of the poverty trap assumption [Quah (1997), 
Azariadis and Stachurski (2004), Kraay and Raddatz (2007)]. Analytically, poverty trap generally refers 
to a situation where the aggregate distribution of per capita income of a group of countries can be 
modeled with a bimodal distribution, with low-income countries clustered around the low-level 
poverty trap equilibrium and the rich countries clustered around the high equilibrium at the higher 
end of the distribution.15  
 
In the long run, the poverty trap assumption implies a widening welfare gap between the low-income 
countries caught in a vicious circle of deepening poverty resulting from stunted growth and excess 
volatility and the rich countries enjoying virtuous circles of continued per capita income growth.16 In 
theory, this skewed accumulation process should be sustained to result in an increasing distance (in 
absolute terms) between the low-level poverty trap equilibrium of poor countries and higher 
equilibrium enjoyed by the more advanced economies. Using non-parametric techniques, Quah 
(1996, 1997) established the existence of such bimodal distributions for a cross-section of countries.  
 
However, departing from the bimodality hypothesis, another definition of poverty trap stresses the 
existence of self-reinforcing mechanisms which cause poverty to persist overtime [Azariadis and 
Stachurski (2004)]. Bloom et al. (2003) single out geographical characteristics as key among these 
mechanisms.17 Other mechanisms that may contribute to persistency of poverty include the market 
and business environment, low savings, productivity and institutional factors [Acemoglu et al. (2001), 
Islam (2002)]. Mckenzie and Woodruff (2004) find that large fixed costs to starting business may be 
responsible for poverty traps in developing countries, especially under imperfect capital and credit 
markets.18 On the other hand, Kraay and Raddatz (2007) find little evidence of the existence of the 
poverty trap emanating from saving crunch and low productivity in developing countries. 
 
                                                 
15 However, the bimodality hypothesis is not always sustained empirically. According to Kremer et al. (2001), 
the dynamics of world income distribution are better characterized by a prolonged transition whereby rising 
income inequality converges towards a singly peaked long-run distribution, with a bimodal shape. 
16 Note that this definition of poverty trap differs from the strong form of poverty trap definition which 
assumes “zero growth” in countries at the lower end of the income distribution. Countries may record positive 
growth rates from time to time, but in a context of high frequency of business cycles where episodes of 
positive growth are followed by negative spikes, average long-run growth rates are negative.  
17 Similarly, Jalan and Ravallion (2002) found that the consumption growth at the household level increases 
with the local availability of “geographical capital”, suggesting the existence of a spatial poverty trap. 
18 Under imperfect capital markets where potential entrepreneurs are credit-constrained by lack of collateral, 
poverty traps may exist because individuals who start out with low wealth are unable to finance potentially 
profitable investments in new business. 
  9However, the challenges of explaining the divergent growth and development path between Sub-
Saharan Africa and other regions of the developing world, and particularly emerging market 
economies, which recorded sustained investments and productivity growth remain. To explain this 
poverty trap puzzle, a few studies departed from the bimodal distributional assumptions and 
geographical constraints to look at models of low-technology base poverty trap [Azariadis and 
Drazen (1990) and Kraay and Raddatz (2007)]. These models share a common feature in that 
increasing returns to scale is assumed to be external to firms. So in a model of homogeneous firms, 
the technology of a representative firm i has the form:  
 
) , ( ) ( i i i i L K F a A Y =                               (2) 
 
where   are private capital and labor input and   is the aggregate output.  is the scale 
factor capturing total factor productivity. Under these models, technology trap leads to poverty trap 
through the productivity channel. In practice, productivity growth and output expansion should be 
expected from technology acquisition and improved production processes at the firm level. 
Moreover, the scale factor is assumed to depend on a measure of aggregate economic activity— 
economic overheating may undermine output expansion in certain sectors, especially if there is a 
shortage of supply in the market of intermediate goods.  
) ( , i i L K i Y ) (a A
 
However, there are a host of other variables that may also affect the scale parameter, including 
aggregate level of output [Kraay and Raddatz (2007)],  aggregate level of capital as suggested from the 
literature on capital-embodied knowledge developed by Romer (1986), and level of capital per worker 
[Azariadis and Drazen (1990)].19 This last variation, which is derived from threshold externalities 
models, is quite appealing because it proposes a simple specification with a threshold level of capital 
at which there is a technological jump. In practice, a change in technological endowment can be used 
to assess counterfactually the potential growth and welfare benefits, ceteris paribus or alternatively 
the implications of ‘technological lag’ for poverty trap.  
 
The ability of technology to account for differences in income across countries depends on a 
minimum capital threshold under these models. In theory, an exogenous improvement in 
productivity should be expected, once the capital reaches a certain critical threshold. In this 
framework, a low-technology-based poverty trap may exist because for a given saving rate, low 
productivity implies that investment is not sufficient to generate sustained growth in the capital 
stock. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) actually derive the degree of increasing returns necessary to obtain a 
low equilibrium poverty trap from a class of models with optimizing agents facing technology that 
has increasing returns external to the firm. In particular the existence of stable poverty trap 
equilibrium requires external increasing returns to be sufficiently large relative to the diminishing 
returns in the production function.  
 
However, they find such strong increasing returns to be inconsistent with estimates from the 
literature. In fact, existing models assume certain values for the parameters in the calibration process. 
Moreover, the performance of the model depends on the stability of the increasing returns to scale 
assumptions over time. In practice, estimates of increasing returns are highly sensitive and subject to 
changes over time. In fact, for the same region, estimates differ depending on methodologies 
                                                 
19 This last specification has the advantage of eliminating the scale effect that is present in Romer (1986) and 
Barro (1990). However, the majority of these models do not establish a minimum technological threshold to 
exit the poverty trap. A dynamic general equilibrium model taking into account the effects of improved 
technology on productivity with a feedback loop is necessary for the establishment of such a threshold. 
  10[Antweiler and Trefler (2000), Van Biesesebroeck (2005)].20. This paper takes a different approach in 
assessing the implications of technology trap for poverty trap. It assumes the existence of a 
technology trap on the basis of persistent ‘technology lag’ and assesses the implications of the 
structural technology deficit for the resilience of poverty using a principal component analysis (PCA) 
technique, which draws on linear transformation to achieve data compression without loss of 
information.  
 
In essence, this data reduction technique displays the eigenvalue decomposition of the sample second 
moment of a group of series, following the linear transformation. The first principal component is 
computed as a linear combination of the series in the group with weights given by the first 
eigenvector. The higher the degree of co-movements between the original series, the fewer the 
number of principal components needed to explain the proportional variance of that set. 
Alternatively, the convergence process is very slow when the vectors in the series are completely 
uncorrelated. In this case a maximum number of eigenvectors is needed to explain most of the 
proportional variance observed. In theory, the covariance matrix associated with such vectors is equal 
to zero.21 
 
Inference from this technique is derived from the estimated eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The size of 
the first eigenvalue provides the direction of largest variance while the second eigenvalue, orthogonal 
to the first one, provides the direction of minimum variance in the data.22 The reduction of the 
multidimensional vector to a two-dimensional space of low-technology trap and poverty trap allows 
one to assess the implications of low technology endowment for poverty from a reduced model. 
Under this model, inference on the welfare effects of technology trap is less affected by the stability 
of increasing returns estimates. Moreover, the methodology is highly data-intensive, and hence, may 
allow one to assess the implications of technology jumps on welfare.23  
 
Although a partial equilibrium analysis, this data reduction technique provides an empirical 
characterization of technology and poverty trap attributes. Conceptually, the reduction of the 
problem to a two-dimensional space allows a representation of countries on the path of poverty trap 
and technology trap. In particular, areas of low equilibrium of dual traps (poverty trap and 
technology trap) and areas of higher equilibrium (relatively high technology endowment and income) 
can be sketched on the same two-dimensional vector space, where each point on the space 
represents the level of aggregate output for a given level of technology. 
 
Figure 2 below sketches that two-dimensional representation. Countries confronted with technology 
trap and poverty trap fall in the first quadrant (bottom left), where income and technology 
endowment are relatively low and consistently fall below the median point. In both panels the dual 
trap is characterized by pull-factors, symbolized by the arrows pointing towards the origins to 
                                                 
20 In fact, the range of Sub-Saharan African’s increasing returns estimates varied markedly between 2000 and 
2005, and were higher than the OECD averages which were uniformly inferior to unity. 
21 A detailed description and overview of the rationale for using the PCA methodology is provided in Annex. 
For further details see Morrison (1990). 
22 For instance, should the largest eigenvalue be knowledge, proxy for stock of technology and technological 
progress, it would imply that most of the proportional variance observed in the global distribution of income is 
explained by the variation in the diffusion of technology and knowledge at the global level. 
23 However, by design the proposed PCA methodology is static and based on a partial equilibrium analysis. In 
practice, a change in the level of technology should have implications on productivity and income. Moreover, 
the prospects of technology jumps depend on a prior shift in the threshold level of capital. In fact, for models 
of threshold externalities improvement of productivity depends on the scale of capital per worker, suggesting 
that productivity growth requires strong investment rates sustained over a long period [Kraay and Raddatz 
(2007)]. In practice, countries in SSA recorded low investment rates during most of the adjustment era, with a 
rapid depreciation of fixed capital stock [Akyuz and Gore (2001), Bu (2006), Bayraktar and Fofack (2007)]. 
  11maintain countries in the trap. On the other hand, countries enjoying constant technological 
improvement fall in the area of higher equilibrium (top right quadrant) within the vicinity of the 
global technology frontier (Point A).  
 
The consistent increase in income and technological endowment of countries in the higher 
equilibrium set is illustrated by a shift towards the global technology frontier in panel II. Since the 
poverty and technology trap hypothesis assumes the existence of self-reinforcing mechanisms which 
cause countries to remain poor on the technology ladder and welfare score, 
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On the other hand, technology jump  leads to increase aggregate 
output in the higher equilibrium set( . Assuming that the more 
technological endowed country A is setting the pace of technological advances at the global level, the 
point A is located on the global technology frontier; while the point B falls in the first quadrant of 
dual traps.  
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The frontier is shown as being curve inwards (increasing returns to scale assumption) intersecting the 
45 degree line in the fourth quadrant (panel I). At time , the technology gap between countries A 
and B in the x-axis is mirrored by the output gap on the y-axis. The rightward shift on the global 
technology frontier in the second Panel is the result of technology jump in country 
A . Under the technology trap assumption there is no technology jump in country 
B . The widening technology gap between the two countries (illustrated by the 
increasing distance from the global technology frontier along the 45 degree line) leads to increasing 
productivity and output gap between the two countries.  
0 t
) 0 ) ( ( > Δ T
A
t tδ




Now suppose that the initial random matrix  X
r
 of dimension   is reduced to a vector of n-
rows and 2 columns; that is
) , ( p n
T x x X ) , ( 2 1 =
r
, following the construction of a composite index 
summarizing technology endowment and knowledge. The focus of the analysis is to assess the degree 
of co-variation between technological progress and income growth. Suppose that the first vector 
represents the Knowledge Economy Index (KEI), proxy for technological endowment, and   
the distribution of Purchasing Power Parity-adjusted per capita income following a logarithmic 
transformation, both of which are deviated from their mean. The KEI is an aggregate and composite 
index representing the overall level of development of a country and its progress towards the 
knowledge economy. 








                                                 
24 The Knowledge Economy Index is produced by the World Bank for cross-countries comparisons on the 
scale of knowledge and economic development. This index is constructed from the normalized performance 
scores of a country averaged across four criteria: economic incentives and institutional framework, human 
resource development and knowledge accumulation, innovation system, information and communication 
technology and scientific infrastructures. The development and adoption of this composite index which has 
become very popular is the resultant of increasing emphasis on the contribution of knowledge, research and 
development for long-run growth over the past few decades [World Bank (2007)]. 
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The PCA results are summarized in Table 1 in the Annex. Figure 3 plots the data with overlayed 
eigenvectors. The Figure plots on the same scale graphs of eigenvectors associated with the whole 
sample comprising of advanced economies (OECD countries) and Sub-Saharan African countries. In 
the first panel, the top figure does not include South Africa and Mauritius which have relatively more 
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  13Figure 3: Plot of transformed data with overlayed eigenvectors 
 










































































  14The first eigenvector (dotted line), which has the largest eigenvalue, points to the direction of the 
largest variance (right and upwards), whereas the second eigenvector (solid line), orthogonal to the 
first one, points to the left and upwards. The first eigenvalue refers to the variable knowledge 
economy index (KEI). This eigenvalue is large, explaining over 99 percent of proportional variance in 
the data. In fact, the cumulative proportional variance associated with this vector is in excess of 99 
percent. The large proportional variance associated with this variable is reflected in the scale and 
norm of the eigenvector in dotted lines, implying that most of the variation in the original bivariate 
data sets is due to the distribution of knowledge, proxy for technology endowment.  
 
Moreover, the data set is disjoint, with advanced OECD countries falling in the upper right quadrant 
of higher equilibrium, where countries enjoy both high technology endowment and high income. 
Furthermore, a disjoint representation is present in the dataset in spite of the initial dispersion in the 
marginal distribution of advanced economies on both income and technology ladder [Pianta (1995)]. 
On the other hand, the bottom left quadrant corresponds to the lower equilibrium of dual traps. 
Except South Africa and Mauritius, which fall around the median, all the other countries are 
clustered in the lower equilibrium of dual poverty and technology trap.25  
 
  
IV.  Model for estimating the welfare effects of technology enhancement 
 
This section presents a working model of growth with endogenous human capital. This model 
emphasizes R&D and human capital, which are keys to technology acquisition, productivity growth 
and innovations in the process of economic development. However, this specification is a slight 
modification of classic technology-trap models, which require a high capital-labor ratio to achieve a 
steady-state equilibrium.26 While the proposed model takes into account Africa’s structural 
constraints and initial conditions, most notably relatively low capital-labor ratio, macroeconomic 
instability, integration into the global economy and institutional factors, it also emphasizes research 
and development investments to capture its ‘technology lag’ on the global technology frontier.27  
 
Let   be a neoclassical production function where aggregate output   is produced 
from labor   and capital   under certain technology . This function is assumed twice 
differentiable with respect to  and . Its first derivatives are positive, the second derivatives 
are negative, and the cross-derivative between   and   is positive. The level of technology 
influences the derivative of  and . Hence output growth is an increasing function of 
capital and labor, and technological progress has positive incidence on growth. Adjusting for other 
factors, the standard neoclassical production function can be represented as a variant of the 
generalized Cobb-Douglas production function of the form: 
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25 Recall from section II that South Africa and Mauritius are more diversified economies with expanding 
industrial and manufacturing outputs. 
26 In particular, these models hypothesize that a country that start with a relatively low capital-labor ratio is 
likely to remain in the stagnant steady-sate. 
27 This adjustment is important because productivity growth increasingly depends on existing stock of ideas and 
the number of people devoting their time to research and accumulation of new ideas in the knowledge 
economy era.  
 
  15where  is the efficiency variable that will be defined below. Under this specification (4) takes the 





τ β α   and     ,    represent the production elasticities of labor, capital and efficiency variable 
at timet, respectively. The parameter ξ  associated with   is the technology-output elasticity.   t A
 
Following Papageorgiou and Perez-Sebastian (2002), R&D is the only link between economies at the 
global level. Hence, productivity growth depends on the existing stock of ideas and the number of 
people devoting their time to the accumulation of new ideas. In practice, inventions made in the rest 
of the world can be absorbed by local scientists at a cost that is inversely proportional to the country 
technological endowment as part of the technological diffusion process. In this case, the level of 
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t A is the global technology frontier, uniformly superior to the state of technology in Africa and 
growing exogenously. The time-invariance assumption reflects persistent ‘technology lag’ in the sub-
region. Moreover, consistent with the technology trap hypothesis, the model assumes widening 
technology gap, hence the technology gap parameter 
) ( t A
. 0 > ψ  The parameterφ weights the effects of 
the stock of existing technology ( ) in a given country on R&D productivity. R&D productivity is 
proportional to the state of technology and grows accordingly [Parente and Prescott (1994)]. The rate 
of depreciation of capital stock and technology is assumed higher in Africa, result of systemic 
undermaintenance and declining R&D budget [Bu (2006)].
t A
28    ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ At δ is the rate of depreciation, 
and  , where   is the global depreciation rate.   t At At        ,  




The model is technology-driven, and  represents the proportion of researchers in the economy at 
any given time . Over time, the stock of researchers in the economy depends on the size of active 
labor force, investment in higher education and human capital improvement through on-the-job 
training and the going stock of ‘brain drain’. The permanence of researchers in a given economy 
critically depends on countries’ distance from the global technology frontier and business climate. 
The inter-temporal human capital spillovers across generations are positively linked to human capital 
accumulation in the next period. The higher the inherited stock of human capital, the more 
productive investments in human capital will be. Hence, following Lucas (1988), the rate of change in 
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28 Bu found depreciation rates of capital stocks to be excessively high in developing countries and particularly 
in SSA. Ghana had a depreciation rate averaging 50 percent for machinery and equipment 
  16For  0     , 1 0    , 1 0    , 1 0 > < < ≤ ≤ < < γ ω θ l  and where  is the proportion of workers investing in 
human capital improvement. This last variable is growing by a factor of 
l
γ according to an 
exponential rateθ . The parameterω captures the brain drain effect. This parameter (ω ) equals zero 
when no qualified researcher leaves the country, an assumption which implies that the country is 
operating on the global technology frontier. Conversely ω equals one if all highly-skilled people 
automatically migrate to greener pasture.29 The actual labor force can be represented in terms of 
researchers by , where   is the proportion of qualified researchers in the active labor 
force, and evolves according to (6).  
t At t p R L / = t p
At R
 
If λ captures the decreasing returns to R&D efforts and μ  is the overall technology parameter, then 
the country technology level in the next period can be expressed in terms of degree of global 
‘technology lag’, the stock of researchers and the stock of technology in the previous period. 
Accordingly, aggregate output growth can be expressed in terms of skilled labor, in a context of 
excess supply of labor and structurally high unemployment rates. Remember that productivity growth 
primarily depends on technology endowment, existing stock of ideas and the number of active 
researchers [Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Nyarko (2007)]. 
 
Assuming that productivity growth primarily depends on stock of ideas and number of active 
researchers in a given country, R&D productivity can then be taken to be proportional to the state of 
technology and grows accordingly [Parente and Prescott (1994)]. Productivity also depends on the 
degree of integration into the world economy and the process of technology diffusion at the global 
level. Presumably a diffusion process underpinned by a uniform distribution on the spherical space is 
the ideal model with global benefits. However, the technology diffusion process is inherently skewed, 
with only a very limited number of globally competitive and efficient economies operating on the 
global technology frontier [Lucas (2007)].  
 
The persistent technology gap across Sub-Saharan Africa also depends on a number of 
considerations, including institutional incentives and efficiency. In a number of models, efficiency is 
captured by openness to trade [Sachs and Warner (1997)]. Others have modeled efficiency using 
country risks [Knack and Keefer (1995)].30 The efficiency vector  in (4) accounts for trade 
openness and macroeconomic instability. Productivity growth is inversely related to macroeconomic 
instability and uncertainty, and proportional to trade openness through technology diffusion. 
Building on Kneller and Stevens (2002), the efficiency factor is represented by (7): 
t B
 
) exp( * ) exp(
υ κ σ
At At At t v u o B − =        (7) 
 
where the variable stands for trade openness,  and are measure of inflation 
(macroeconomic instability and volatility) and financial depth, respectively. The parameters 
At o At u At v
                                                 
29 The two-period model can also be extended to inter-generational human capital transfers if the inter-
temporal human capital spillovers across generations are positively linked to human capital accumulation in the 
next period [Lucas (1988)]. In other word, the higher the inherited stock of human capital the more productive 
investments in human capital will be. 
30 However, openness to international trade measured by the propensity of imports and exports may not 
necessarily reflect the extent of technology acquisition and assimilation. The composition of exports matters 
and the share of high-tech exports may appear as a better indicator of integration into the global economy.  
  17υ κ σ   and     , are constant elasticity of substitution.31 Although economic inefficiency may originate 
from a host of factors, including institutional, social and geographic and macroeconomic factors, the 
proposed model focuses on inefficiency factors caused by macroeconomic instability, and particularly 
inflation and changes in the monetary base.32 Using equations (5)—(7), the initial production 
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Assuming that the depreciation rate of capital stock and technology  1 → At δ  in the absence of 
capital injection and investments in maintenance of existing infrastructures in the face of growing 
fiscal deficits, and expressing labor force as a function of researchers, then the aggregate production 
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Taking the logarithm across (9) and rearranging it results in the following: 
 
t At At At
t
t
At t t K v u o
A
A
R p A ln ln ln ) ( ln ln






+ + + − + t Y ln ln ξφ =
 (10) 
or  
  t t At At At
t
t
At t K p v u o
A
A











β α α α τυ α τκ α τσ
ξψ α α ξλ α ξφ α μ ξ α
= − = − = − =
= + = =
8 7 6 5
3 2 1
   ,     ,    ,    ,






                                                 
31 This formulation is a slightly modified version of Kneller and Stevens (2002). They account for inefficiency 
by including an indicator variable  it η in their model ) 1 0 ( < < it η . A country is fully efficient and produces on 
the frontier when ) 1 ( = it η ; otherwise it produces inefficiently with the degree of inefficiency measured by the 
size of it η . 
32 For instance Battese and Coelli measure inefficiency by a conditional distribution, which has mean level of 
inefficiency derived from a set of economic, geographic and social factors which affect technical efficiency. 
33 This assumption is used for all practical purposes, though depreciation rates already generally high in the 
developing world are even higher in the Sub-Saharan African region [Bu (2006)].  
  18The technology lag , which measures the distance from the global technology frontier, is 
proxied by the proportion of high-tech exports of the sub-region. Capital accumulation is proxied by 
investments. Other variables in the model are consistent and accordingly defined.
) / (
*
t t A A
34 This specification 
takes into account the constraint of data availability. Unlike advanced economies, the data on R&D is 
not always readily available in most developing countries. In this framework they are estimated from 
a method which combines simulation and instrumented parameters from OECD data. More 
specifically, R&D elasticity of economic growth is estimated from a panel of OECD countries using 
the model. A random number generator is then used to construct an R&D vector consistent with 
R&D empirical distributions in Sub-Saharan Africa.      
 
The simulated R&D vector and estimated R&D elasticity of growth from OECD countries are used 
to draw inference on the implications of technological advances for growth and welfare in SSA. In 
particular, a marginal and joint variation of R&D elasticity of growth around the mean value and 
uniform changes in R&D scale are considered in assessing the expected welfare effects. The impact 
of technological changes measured primarily by R&D increases on poverty is also considered, 
drawing on the recursive modeling assumption. In particular and following Kakwani and Pernia 
(2000), poverty indices at any given period depend on the rate in the previous period, the poverty and 
growth elasticity and per capita GDP growth rates.35  
 
V.  Estimation and policy implications  
 
Estimation and applications are based on a pseudo-panel data covering the period 1990-2001. The 
focus is inference on income and welfare effects of advances in sciences and technology through 
increased research and development expenditures. The results and calibration are based on equation 
(10). A marginal and joint variation of R&D elasticity of growth and uniform changes in R&D scale 
are considered, in turn. The link to micro data and household survey allows inference on poverty. 
 
The first simulation assumes increases expenditures on research and development under constant 
R&D elasticity of growth. The regression coefficients in equation (10) are either elasticities or semi-
elasticities and provide the proportionate change in the conditional mean of aggregate output when 
the specified regressor is subject to changes.36 Under the base case scenario, the estimated R&D 
elasticity of growth is set at the average going rates across OECD countries (8 percent). The sign and 
magnitude of growth elasticity are consistent with estimates obtained in the literature, which 
establishes a positive association between R&D and economic growth [Mansfield (1972), Gittleman 
and Wolff (1995)].   
 
Table 2 in the Annex reports the econometric results.37 The likelihood test rejects the null hypothesis 
that the underlined model does not provide a good prediction of GDP. In particular, the F-statistic is 
                                                 
34 Aggregate output is estimated in constant 2000US$; openness is estimated as the sum of exports and imports 
expressed as a percentage of GDP; financial depth is proxied by M2 over GDP and macroeconomic instability 
is measured by inflation rate of consumer price index.  
35 That is  , where      ˆ ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
) , ( 1 GDP t t t P P θ δ α α − ∗ = − δ is the poverty and growth elasticity,   is 
the growth rate of GDP per capita and 
) , ( ˆ
GDP t θ
). 2 0 ( ≤ ≤α  We are particularly interested in the poverty incidence 
rate   ) 0 = (α . For further details on the methodology see Kakwani and Pernia (2000).   
36 The parameters are elasticities when the regressors are taken in logs and semi-elasticities when they are not. 
37 In addition to R&D the basic model (constant R&D elasticity of growth) considers five exogenous variables 
for their potential impact on growth: M2 in GDP to capture the financial depth, investment, inflation rate of 
consumer price index to capture macroeconomic volatility, the sum of imports and exports over GDP to 
capture the degree of economic openness, and high-tech exports as a share of total exports. This last variable 
also highlights the degree of economic diversification and integration into the global economy. 
  19large, suggesting that the model is statistically significant at the 1-percent level of significance. 
Similarly, the Chi-Squared statistics which tests the joint significance of all independent variables in 
the model rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance. Most explanatory variables are 
statistically significant at 1-percent level and the trend of per capita GDP (solid and dark line in 
Figure 4-A and B) is consistent with actual trend from empirical observations.  
 
Figure 4: Estimated GDP per capita for increasing R&D expenditures 
 













































































































Actual GDP per capita (in 2000 US$)
GDP per capita (in 2000 US$) with 30% growth rate of R&D and lower elasticity = 4%
GDP per capita (in 2000 US$) with 30% growth rate of R&D and elasticity = 8%
 
 











































































































Actual GDP per capita (in 2000 US$)
GDP per capita (in 2000 US$) with 85% growth rate of R&D and lower elasticity = 4%
GDP per capita (in 2000 US$) with 85% growth rate of R&D and elasticity = 8%
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Figure 4-A also provides estimates of GDP per capita for higher level of R&D expenditures. In 
particular a 30 percent increase in R&D expenses is assumed over the period under two alternative 
scenarios: constant R&D elasticity of growth (8 percent) and lower R&D elasticity of growth (4 
percent). A much lower rate is considered because empirical studies suggest that total factor 
productivity, which depends on R&D investment, is lower in developing countries [Chenery et al. 
(1986)].38 A comparison with the base case shows a rapid increase in per capita GDP, even under 
lower R&D growth elasticity, suggesting significant growth and welfare returns for technological 
advances. For instance, if R&D expenses had been growing at 30% above their current levels, per 
capita GDP would be US$700 in Sub-Saharan Africa (about twice the current estimates) for a much 
lower R&D elasticity of growth. A higher elasticity of growth would have resulted in even larger 
returns, with per capita GDP increasing by over threefold.       
 
Figure 4-B assumes that SSA’s R&D expenses are growing at OECD rates; this implies about 85 
percent increase. The resulting outcome under this hypothetical technological catch-up scenario is 
even more impressive. A twofold increase in income is registered when R&D elasticity of growth is 
lower than the OECD average (4 percent). And when the elasticity is set to equal the going OECD 
rate, the income growth is even more impressive, increasing by over fivefold. In other words, if 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were using the same technology enjoyed by OECD countries, their 
income gap with advanced economies would be significantly smaller.  
 
With the rapid increase in income under the hypothetical technological catch-up hypothesis the 
poverty and welfare effects of R&D improvement should be positive. In order to assess the poverty 
effects of increased R&D expenses, the poverty rate for Ethiopia are estimated using per capita GDP 
growth rates and the derived elasticities. The results are shown in Figure 5. Note that, increases in 
R&D spending results in a significant reduction of poverty. The gap between actual and estimated 
poverty rates uniformly increases over time.     
 









































































































Actual growth rate of GDP and -0.56 income elasticity Elasticity -0.56 and with 10% growth rate of R&D
Elasticity -0.56 and with 20% growth rate of R&D Elasticity -0.56 and with 30% growth rate of R&D
 
                                                 
38 Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) find that increases in total factor productivity accounts for about a 
third of growth in valued added in developing countries and nearly one-half for the developed world.  
  21A counterfactual simulation suggests that if R&D expenses had been growing at about 20% above 
their current levels, poverty rates would be significantly lower in Ethiopia— about 60 percent, ceteris 
paribus (Figure 5). This corresponds to over 20 percent reduction from the going rate of 75 percent 
in 2005. Though already significant, an even lower poverty rate (50 percent) is obtained when R&D 
expenses are raised to 30 percent. This corresponds to about a 35 percent reduction of poverty. 
These results suggest that scientific and technological advances could play a great role in exiting the 
poverty trap to achieving the MDG of halving poverty by 2015 in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Moreover, they suggest that global technology convergence may uniformly lead to income 
convergence in the spherical space; an outcome that is consistent with hypotheses underlying 
neoclassical models. They imply that advances in science and technology may be critical for long-run 
growth and economic development in developed and developing countries alike. Interestingly, these 
results are invariably supported by the impressive development outcomes achieved by countries 
which adopted ‘latecomer development models’ using science and technology as main drivers of 
economic growth in Asia in the second half of the 20th century [Mansfield (1988), Mathews and Hu 
(2007)].39 In fact, much earlier, a similar technological catch-up strategy was used by other latecomers 
in Europe and North America in the 19th century to achieve the status of leading industrialized 





This paper establishes the existence of a technology trap in Sub-Saharan Africa and assesses the 
implications of this trap for growth and poverty using pseudo-panel models with endogenous human 
capital. The effects of technological endowment on poverty are tested using counterfactual 
simulations with the scale of research and development and R&D growth elasticity as instrumental 
variable and parameter, respectively. While the marginal effect of changes on aggregate output 
following increases in either R&D expenditures or R&D growth elasticity is significant, the returns 
from a hypothetical joint increase appears to be even larger, suggesting that the costs of a low 
technology trap are significant for Africa and may largely explain its growing income and poverty gap 
with the rest of the world.  
 
A possible link between the underlined technology trap and the poverty trap may be the productivity 
channel [Lucas (1993), Kraay and Raddatz (2007)]. In fact, existing empirical studies indicate that 
most African countries are operating significantly below their production possibility frontier [Bloom 
et al. (2005)].41 At the same time, a large strand of the literature primarily attributes the enormous 
output and poverty gap in SSA to causes such as climatic and geographical constraints [Sachs and 
Warner (1997), Gallup et al. (1999)]. However, the much higher negative incidence of exogenous 
shocks in SSA may be more of the consequence of a technology trap responsible for the productivity 
and poverty gap, assuming that the uniformity of costly exogenous shocks related to climate and 
geography on the spherical space is yet to be established.  
 
                                                 
39 It is believed that this model was first developed by Japan in Asia and later followed by other countries in 
East Asia. Stressing the critical role played by science and technology in the development process, Deng 
Xiaoping, the Chinese leader referred to “science and technology as the primary productive forces.” 
40 Interestingly, Germany and the United States, which dominated the 20th century were classified as latecomer 
nations in the previous century and relied on technological catch-up strategies to bridge their knowledge and 
development gaps. For further details see Gerschenkron (1962). 
41 According to these authors, the productivity gap could be in the magnitude of 25 percent, which is very high 
even by developing countries standards. 
  22In fact, there are a host of countries in other parts of the world which are confronted with similar 
climatic and geographical constraints, yet have managed to achieve sustained economic growth, 
resulting in rapid income growth and generalized improvement of living standards. The difference, 
though, is that these countries have consistently built on scientific and technological advances to 
establish frontier industries to mitigate the negative incidence of exogenous shocks and growth 
volatility and enjoy long-run virtuous circles of sustained growth which comes with significant 
employment and welfare benefits. In contrast, the technology trap has locked the majority of African 
countries in a low productivity trap and extended the life cycle of pre-independence development 
models of rents characterized by excessive reliance on exports of raw materials and primary products 
in the era of globalization increasingly driven by exports of manufactured goods.  
 
Over time, the extension of these colonial development models has kept the region below its 
production possibility frontier and reduced its expected gains from globalization. Overcoming the 
large productivity gap and converging towards the global production possibility frontier to realize 
growth potentials is the main challenge facing the majority of African countries. And to the extent 
that advances in technology and scientific research have been the main drivers of productivity 
growth, raising the productivity bar in the region may require exiting the technology trap and 
establishing academic and research institutions which are globally competitive and producing world-
class scientists and engineers to push African economies towards the global technology frontier.42  
 
After all, the more efficient economies, continuously enjoying high productivity growth, tend to 
operate on the global technology frontier, or are not far off it. In this regard, extending the famous 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) model— which singles out the lack of education as a key factor to explain 
the technology trap which keeps countries away from the global best practice technology— to  























                                                 
42 In fact, debating the Japanese’s development strategy in the post-war era, Kotaro Honda, the inventor of the 
KS steel (initials from Kichiei Sumitomo), a magnetic steel that is three times more resistant than tungsten 
steel, asserted that “no real industrial development could be attained without basic research in the major 
scientific fields.” For details see Tohoku University (1966).     
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Proof of Proposition 1: 
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Let   and  , where L and K are 
labor and capital, respectively.  are variables determining technology endowment. Suppose 
that the composition of capital and labor is time-invariant in both countries and that the production 
function is homogeneous of degree n. Moreover, the production functions  are 
real-value functions assumed to be twice differentiable with respect to . They have a 
positive first derivative, a negative second derivative and the cross-derivative between  is 
positive. Also suppose that aggregate output is a strictly increasing function of technology and that 
finite output increases a-times with technological progress
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Now we have to show that the rightmost term converges to a constant. That is 
   Note that a series ∑ converges if its sequence of partial sums 
, where   converges. For the series  the n-th partial sum 
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Overview of Principal Component Analysis 
 
Assuming the existence of a co-variation between output growth measured by per capita income 
growth and technology measured by a composite index—Knowledge Economy Index, the 
magnitude and scale of the estimated eigenvalues and eigenvectors derived from this technique are 
used to assess the covariation between technology acquisition and economic growth in a large sample 
of OECD and Sub-Saharan African countries. The estimated eigenvalues are derived using the 




 be a random vector, where  . The covariance matrix of this random vector 
is given by: 
T
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Where  } {x E x = μ  denotes the population mean. Note that the covariance matrix which has 
components denoted by   is a symmetric matrix. One can therefore calculate an orthogonal basis 
of that matrix by finding its corresponding eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The eigenvectors   and 
eigenvalues   are solutions to the equation: 
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Table 1: Covariance Information 
 
Sample size: 53 (OECD and Sub-Saharan African countries, including South Africa and 
Mauritius). The sample size reduces to 51 when South Africa and Mauritius are excluded. 
What follows is information on covariance of KEI (Knowledge Economy Index) and the 
log of GDDPC (PPP-adjusted per capita income), both of which are deviated from mean.  
 
Whole sample 
  Comp 1  Comp 2 
Eigenvalue   15.45590   0.130870 
Variance Prop.   0.991604   0.008396 
Cumulative Prop.   0.991604   1.000000 
Eigenvectors: 
Variable  Vector 1  Vector 2 
KEI -0.850002    0.526779 
GDPPC -0.526779  -0.850002 
 
 
Excluding South Africa and Mauritius 
 
  Comp 1  Comp 2 
Eigenvalue   16.04449   0.125470 
Variance Prop.   0.992241   0.007759 
Cumulative Prop.   0.992241   1.000000 
Eigenvectors: 
Variable  Vector 1  Vector 2 
KEI -0.849560    0.527493 
GDPPC -0.527493  -0.849560 
    
 
10 % higher KEI for SSA 
 
  Comp 1  Comp 2 
Eigenvalue   14.99289   0.128389 
Variance Prop.   0.991509   0.008491 
Cumulative Prop.   0.991509   1.000000 
Eigenvectors: 
Variable  Vector 1  Vector 2 
KEI -0.844831    0.535033 
GDPPC -0.535033  -0.844831 
 
 
  30 
Excluding South Africa and Mauritius 10 % higher 
KEI for SSA 
 
  Comp 1  Comp 2 
Eigenvalue   15.57430   0.127531 
Variance Prop.   0.991878   0.008122 
Cumulative Prop.   0.991878   1.000000 
Eigenvectors: 
Variable  Vector 1  Vector 2 
KEI -0.844617    0.535371 
GDPPC -0.535371  -0.844617 
 
 
20 % higher KEI for SSA 
 
  Comp 1  Comp 2 
Eigenvalue   14.55094   0.130481 
Variance Prop.   0.991113   0.008887 
Cumulative Prop.   0.991113   1.000000 
Eigenvectors: 
Variable  Vector 1  Vector 2 
KEI -0.839685    0.543074 
GDPPC -0.543074  -0.839685 
 
 
Excluding South Africa and Mauritius 20 % higher 
KEI for SSA 
 
  Comp 1  Comp 2 
Eigenvalue   15.11642   0.130719 
Variance Prop.   0.991427   0.008573 
Cumulative Prop.   0.991427   1.000000 
Eigenvectors: 
Variable  Vector 1  Vector 2 
KEI -0.839507    0.543349 
GDPPC -0.543349  -0.839507 
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Table 2: Regression Results 
 
LGDPPC: log of real GDP per capita 
LOECDRDPC: log of real spending on R&D for OECD countries 
XGDP+MGDP: Total exports and imports in % of GDP 
M2GDP: M2 in % of GDP 
INFCPI: CPI inflation rate 
INV: total capital formation in % of GDP 
RESEARCHER: Number of researchers per thousand employments 
HTX: High-technology exports in % of manufactured exports 
 
Dependent Variable: LGDPPC? 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1988 2004 
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints 
Number of cross-sections used: 16 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 163 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LOECDRDPC? 0.081920 0.038508 2.127376 0.0351
(XGDP?+MGDP?) 0.002667 0.000538 4.962326 0.0000
M2GDP? 0.001638 0.000792 2.067925 0.0405
INFCPI? -0.000914 0.000598 -1.529590 0.1284
INV? 0.003644 0.001838 1.982181 0.0494
RESEARCHER? 0.035381 0.006531 5.417314 0.0000
HTX? 0.002680 0.002105 1.272800 0.2052
Fixed Effects         
_AUSS—C 8.781759      
_CAN—C 8.844947      
_CZE—C 7.609842      
_DEN—C 9.070881      
_HUN—C 7.454519      
_JAP—C 9.155843      
_KOR—C 8.148333      
_MEX—C 8.024490      
_NEW—C 8.430819      
_NOR—C 9.211457      
_POL—C 7.647203      
_SLO—C 7.207117      
_SWE—C 8.916319      
_SWIT—C 9.125794      
_TUR—C 7.463686      
_US—C 9.177728      
R-squared  0.996885     Mean dependent var  9.303052
Adjusted R-squared  0.996395     S.D. dependent var  0.929256
S.E. of regression  0.055795     Sum squared resid  0.435824
Log likelihood  251.5407     F-statistic  7466.131
Durbin-Watson stat  0.440742     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
 
 